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AbstRAct
Despite the fact that the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights (UNGPs) have specific provisions that are applicable to 
States to ensure that businesses that are owned or controlled by the State, or 
that enter into transactions with the State, respect human rights; most scho-
larship, so far, seems to have focused mainly on the corporate responsibili-
ties of  privately owned entities to respect human rights. This article seeks to 
rectify this apparent gap in scholarship by providing an introduction to what 
the UNGPs refer to in Principles 4, 5 and 6 as ‘the State-business nexus.’ In 
this context, this article is composed of  five sections and proceeds in the 
following manner. The first section introduces the coverage of  the State-bu-
siness nexus in the UNGPs. The second section seeks to determine who are 
the actors to whom the provisions of  UNGPs 4, 5 and 6 may be applicable. 
The third section analyses in detail on Principles 4, 5 and 6 and shows how 
the UNGPs focus on this issue from three different perspectives. The four-
th section examines the content of  the State duty to protect human rights 
in the context of  the State-business nexus, while the fifth section concludes.
Keywords: Human Rights. UNGPs. State-Business Nexus.
AbstRAct
Apesar do fato que os Princípios Orientadores das Nações Unidas so-
bre Empresas e Direitos Humanos (UNGPs) terem disposições específicas 
que são aplicáveis  aos Estados para garantir que as empresas que são de 
propriedade ou controladas pelo Estado, ou que realizam transações com o 
Estado, respeitem os direitos humanos; a maioria dos estudos, até agora, pa-
recem ter se concentrado principalmente nas responsabilidades corporativas 
das entidades privadas para respeitar os direitos humanos. O artigo procura 
corrigir essa aparente lacuna fornecendo uma introdução ao que os UN-
GPs referem nos Princípios 4, 5 e 6 como ‘o nexo Estado-empresa’. Nesse 
contexto, esse artigo é composto de cinco seções e prossegue da seguinte 
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maneira. A primeira seção introduz a cobertura do nexo 
Estado-empresa nos UNGPs. A segunda seção procura 
determinar quem são os atores para os quais as provi-
sões dos PNGs 4, 5 e 6 podem ser aplicáveis. A terceira 
seção analisa em detalhes os Princípios 4, 5 e 6 e mostra 
como os UNGPs enfocam essa questão de três pers-
pectivas diferentes. A quarta seção examina o conteúdo 
do dever do Estado de proteger os direitos humanos no 
contexto do nexo Estado-empresa, enquanto a quinta 
seção conclui.
Palavras-chave: Direitos humanos. UNGPs. Nexo Estado-
Empresa
1. IntRoductIon
1. Since their endorsement in 2011 by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council,1 the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs)2 have become the global standard concerning 
the protection and respect of  human rights in the con-
text of  business activities, applicable to both States and 
corporations. 3 Developed under the auspices of  the 
United Nations (UN), by Professor John Ruggie – then 
Special Representative of  the Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan on the issue of  human rights and transnational 
corporations – the UNGPs have been generally well re-
ceived by States, businesses, civil society4 as well as in 
academia,5 despite some criticism concerning their vo-
luntary nature and certain other design weaknesses.6 Gi-
1  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Council. Resolution 17/4 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
2011. (A/HRC/RES/17/4)
2  RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
implementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. 2011. (A/HRC/17/31)
3  UNITED NATIONS. The corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights: an interpretative guide. 2002. (HR/PUB/12/02). p. 1.
4  BUHMANN, Karin. Navigating from “train wreck” to be-
ing “welcomed”: negotiation strategies and argumentative pat-
terns in the development of  the UN framework. In. DEVA, Surya; 
BILCHITZ, David (Ed.). Human rights obligations of  business: beyond 
the corporate responsibility to respect. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2013. 
5  BERNAZ, Nadia. Business and human rights: history, law and pol-
icy: bridging the accountability gap. Londres: Routlege, 2017. p. 195.
6  DEVA, Surya. Regulating corporate human rights violations: human-
izing business. Londres: Routledge, 2014. p. 110, 112-113; SHAW, 
Malcolm N. International law. 7. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ 
Press, 2014. p. 182-183.
ven that the journey, which ultimately led to the endor-
sement of  the UNGPs by the Human Rights Council, 
had been for a long time, characterised by confrontation 
and failures,7 as witnessed for instance by the lack of  
success of  the Draft UN Code of  Conduct on Trans-
national Corporations8 and the UN Norms on the Res-
ponsibilities of  Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises,9 Professor Ruggie’s achievement 
is by all means remarkable. 
2. While the development of  ideologies that aimed 
to make business act in a responsible manner can be 
traced all the way back to the abolitionist movement 
of  the Atlantic slave trade, which was later followed 
by attempts to develop international labour law and by 
the criminal prosecution of  German industrialists that 
supported the Nazis during WWII,10 it was the UN-
GPs that not only finally managed to achieve a global 
consensus11 on this issue, but ultimately also reopened 
a more balanced dialogue seeking to bridge the often 
diverging interests of  States, businesses and civil socie-
ty.12 Consequently, while the UNGPs do not create any 
new legal obligations as such, for either States or for 
corporations,13 they are nevertheless a key ‘soft law’ ins-
7  BERNAZ, Nádia. Business and human rights: history, law and pol-
icy: bridging the accountability gap. Londres: Routlege, 2017. p. 163-
176; ZERK, Jennifer A. Multinationals and corporate social responsibility: 
limitations and opportunities in international law. First paperback 
edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. p. 244-266.
8  UNITED NATIONS. Draft UN code of  conduct on transnational 
corporations. [1983 Version]. Available at: <investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2891>.; SAUVANT, Karl P. The 
negotiations of  the united nations code of  conduct on transnational 
corporations: experience and lessons learned. The Journal of  World 
Investment and Trade, v. 16, p. 11-87, 2015. p. 11.
9  UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA. Human Rights Library. 
Norms on the responsibilities of  transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with regard to human rights: E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2. 
2003.
10  BERNAZ, Nádia. Business and human rights: history, law and 
policy: bridging the accountability gap. Londres: Routlege, 2017. p. 
17–79.
11  DEVA, Surya. Treating human rights lightly: a critique of  the con-
sensus rhetoric and the language employed by the guiding principles: 
human rights obligations of  business: beyond the corporate respon-
sibility to respect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
This book chapter adopts a critical perspective on the widely ac-
cepted ‘consensus rhetoric’ that is believed to underpin the UNGPs.
12  DEVA, Surya. Treating human rights lightly: a critique of  the con-
sensus rhetoric and the language employed by the guiding princi-
ples: human rights obligations of  business: beyond the corporate 
responsibility to respect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013.  (n. 6). p. 105.
13  SHAW, Malcolm N. International law. 7. ed. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge Univ Press, 2014. p. 182-183. (n. 6) (‘These Principles  Conse 
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trument, which is likely to influence in a positive way14 
the conduct of  both States and businesses, as far the 
integration of  human rights considerations within the 
ambit their economic activities is concerned. For exam-
ple, the UNGPs have prompted the update of  other 
soft law instruments such as the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises15 and the ILO Tripartite De-
claration concerning Multinational Enterprises,16 which 
have both integrated the UNGPs in their texts. The ba-
sic architecture of  the UNGPs is composed of  three 
Pillars and 31 Principles. Pillar I contains Principles 1 
to 10 and focuses on the State duty to protect human 
rights. Pillar II, Principles 11 to 24, deal with the cor-
porate responsibility to respect human rights. Lastly, 
Pillar III Principles 25 to 31 address both States and 
corporations, and clarify that, while it is principally Sta-
tes that have an obligation to ensure that victims of  hu-
man rights abuses have access to appropriate remedies, 
through State-based judicial and non-judicial mechanis-
ms, businesses are also encouraged to create effective 
operational-level grievance mechanisms.17
3. With this general background in mind, it is worthy 
of  note that, bar a few notable and valuable exceptions,18 
international legal obligations as such…The realm is that of  “soft 
law”, of  expectations, of  anticipation not of  binding international 
(as opposed to national) legal regulation.’)
14  SHELTON, Dinah L. ‘Soft law’, handbook of  international 
law. Routledge Press, 2008. Available at:   <http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003387>. (‘Non-binding norms or 
informal social norms can be effective and offer a flexible and ef-
ficient way to order responses to common problems. They are not 
law and they do not need to be in order to influence conduct in the 
desired manner.’)
15   OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises: 2011 edition. Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2011. p. 31-34.
16  INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION. Tripartite 
declaration of  principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy: 
adopted by the Governing Body of  the International Labour Of-
fice at its 204th Session (Geneva, November 1977) and amended at 
its 279th (November 2000), 295th (March 2006) and 329th (March 
2017) Sessions). Geneva: ILO, 2017. p. 3-5.
17  RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
implementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. 2011. (A/HRC/17/31). (n. 2). p. 25-
26. Principles 29 and 30.
18  BACKER, Larry Catá. The human rights obligations of  State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs): emerging conceptual structures and 
principles in national and international law and policy. Vanderbilt 
Journal of  Transnational Law, v. 51, 2017. Available at:  <https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2980533>.; BACKER, 
Larry Catá. Between state, company, and market: a preliminary engage-
ment on the business and human rights obligations of  states and 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Available at: <https://ssrn.com/
scholarship so far seems to have concentrated largely on 
the role that privately-owned transnational corporations 
may have had in the creation of  certain ‘governance 
gaps’,19 other types of  non-State actors are recently be-
coming increasingly important in a globalised world.20 
In this context, Professor Ruggie noted in 2006, barely 
a year after his appointment that:
[W]ays must be found to engage State-owned 
enterprises in addressing human rights challenges 
in their spheres of  operation. They are becoming 
increasingly important players in some of  the most 
troubling industry sectors yet appear to operate 
beyond many of  the external sources of  scrutiny to 
which commercial firms are subject.21
4. As the mandate of  the Special Representative 
advanced on the topic of  business and human rights 
generally, so did the coverage of  State ownership. For 
example, later reports continued to make references to 
the challenges associated with the human rights dimen-
sion of  State ownership and suggested ways how those 
challenges could be tackled.22 The importance of  this 
abstract=2869944>.; RAJAVUORI, Mikko. State ownership and the 
united nations business and human rights agenda: three instruments, 
three narratives. Indiana Journal of  Global Legal Studies, v. 23, n. 2, sum-
mer, 2016. p. 665.
19  SIMONS, Penelope; MACKLIN Audrey. The governance gap: 
extractive industries, human rights, and the home state advantage. 
London: Routledge, 2014. p. 9-21; Zerk (n 7); CLAPHAM, Andrew. 
Human rights obligations of  non-state actors. Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2006. 
p. 195-266.
20  UNITED NATIONS. World investment report 2014: investing in 
the SDGs: an action plan. 2014. p. ix; UNITED NATIONS. World 
investment report 2017: investment and the digital economy. 2017. p. 
30. For example, UNCTAD estimates that there are approximately 
1,500 State-owned multinational enterprises that operated outside 
their home State and which had a network of  more than 86,000 af-
filiates. Furthermore, it should also be noted that sovereign foreign 
direct investment accounted for over 11% of  the total global foreign 
direct investment in 2014. This figure does not however, include 
investments made by sovereign wealth funds, whose assets under 
management have reached close to USD 7.5trillion as of  2018. For 
further information on this see the 2014 UNCTAD World Invest-
ment Report quoted above at page 30.
21  John Ruggie, ‘Promotion and Protection of  Human Rights 
(Interim Report of  the Special Representative of  the Secretary-Gen-
eral on the Issue of  Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises)’ (2006) E/CN.4/2006/97 20.
22  RUGGIE, John G. State responsibilities to regulate and adjudicate 
corporate activities under the united nations core human rights treaties: an 
overview of  treaty body commentaries: report of  the special rep-
resentative of  the secretary-general on the issue of  human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. 
Kennedy School of  Government; Harvard Law Schooll, 2007. (A/
HRC/4/35/Add.1). p. 32-33; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘State Respon-
sibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the 
United Nations’ Core Human Rights Treaties (Report of  the Special 
Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue of  Human 
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issue was underlined, for instance, when it was noted 
that, by virtue of  the connection between the State and 
its businesses, States may be held responsible for the 
acts of  those entities, either under the duty to respect, 
if  State-owned entities are to be considered as State or-
gans or agents, or under the duty to protect, if  Sate-ow-
ned entities are treated on par with private businesses.23 
Ultimately, specific provisions on the State-business ne-
xus were included in UNGPS 4, 5 and 6, as Section 3 of  
this article analyses below.
5. Nevertheless, as some recent reports of  the UN 
Working Group on Business and Human Rights (UN 
Working Group) have shown, while in some circums-
tances significant progress has been made by States as 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises)’ (John F Kennedy School of  Government 2007) paras 10, 
78-80; RUGGIE, John G. Corporations and human rights: a survey of  
the scope and patterns of  alleged corporate-related human rights 
abuse: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-general 
on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises. 2008. (A/HRC/8/5/Add.2). p. 9.; RUG-
GIE, John G. Protect, respect and remedy: a framework for business and 
human rights: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, John Ruggie. 2008. (A/HRC/8/5). 
p.  10-11, 25; RUGGIE, John G. Summary of  five multi-stakeholder 
consultations: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. 2008. (A/HRC/8/5/Add.1). p. 23; 
RUGGIE, John G. State obligations to provide access to remedy for human 
rights abuses by third parties, including business: an overview of  interna-
tional and regional provisions, commentary and decisions (report 
of  the special representative of  the secretary-general on the issue 
of  human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises. 2009. (A/HRC/11/13/Add.1). p. 33.; RUGGIE, John 
G.  Business and human rights: further steps toward the operationali-
zation of  the “protect, respect and remedy” framework: report of  
the special representative of  the secretary- general on the issue of  
human rights and transnational corporations and other business en-
terprises. 2010. (A/HRC/14/27). p. 7-8; RUGGIE, John G. Guiding 
principles on business and human rights: implementing the united nations 
“protect, respect and remedy” framework: report of  the special rep-
resentative of  the secretary-general on the issue of  human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. (n. 2). 
p. 9-10; RUGGIE, John G. Human rights and corporate law: trends and 
observations from a crossnational study conducted by the special 
representative: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. 2011. (A/HRC/17/31/Add.2). p. 
26, 30, 33, 40-41.
23  RUGGIE, John G. State responsibilities to regulate and adjudicate 
corporate activities under the united nations core human rights treaties: an 
overview of  treaty body commentaries: report of  the special rep-
resentative of  the secretary-general on the issue of  human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. 
Kennedy School of  Government; Harvard Law Schooll, 2007. (A/
HRC/4/35/Add.1). (n. 22). p. 33.
far as the State-business nexus is concerned,24 in other 
circumstances State officials were not even aware that 
the UNGPs applied to entities that are owned or con-
trolled by the State.25 This issue has been succinctly 
summarised by Dante Pesce, Chair of  the UN Working 
Group in the following manner:
Governments are currently sending an incoherent 
message to businesses. On the one hand, they 
ask private businesses to respect human rights, 
and increasingly set out such expectations in law 
and policy, on the other hand – barring notable 
exceptions – they show no great desire to use 
the means at their disposal to ensure that those 
enterprises they own or control respect human 
rights. It is high time for States to show concrete 
leadership, and require the enterprises they own or 
control to be role models on human rights. Doing 
so is part of  States’ international legal obligations, 
and it will only reinforce the legitimacy of  States’ 
expectations towards private businesses. Yet these 
human rights impacts – and the duties of  States to 
protect against them – remain largely ignored.
6. The lack of  clear guidance concerning the appli-
cation of  the UNGPs to State-owned entities was also 
noted.26 Furthermore, the UN Working Group has also 
recently issued recommendations to the G20 Group of  
States on how to ensure and advance sustainable supply 
chains, making specific reference to the role that States, 
as economic actors in their own right, have to play in 
this context. Of  particular importance is the fact that 
24  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises on its mission to Brsail: note by the secretariat. 
2016. (A/HRC/32/45/Add.1). p. 6; UNITED NATIONS. Human 
Rights Concil. Promotion and protection of  all human rights, civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development: report 
of  the working group on the issue of  human rights and transna-
tional corporations and other business enterprises on its visit to the 
Republic of  Korea. 2017. (A/HRC/35/32/Add.1). p. 10-12.
25  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises on its visit to the Republic of  Korea. 2017. (A/
HRC/35/32/Add.1).  p. 5.
26  ‘State-Owned Enterprises Must Be “Role Model” in Respect-
ing Human Rights – UN Report’ (UN News, 17 June 2016) <htt-
ps://news.un.org/en/story/2016/06/532442-state-owned-enter-
prises-must-be-role-model-respecting-human-rights-un-report>.; 
UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and protection 
of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, includ-
ing the right to development: report of  the working group on the issue 
of  human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 51, 87, 98, 101.
BA
RN
E
S,
 M
ih
ae
la 
M
ar
ia.
 T
he
 U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 g
ui
di
ng
 p
rin
cip
les
 o
n 
bu
sin
es
s a
nd
 h
um
an
 ri
gh
ts,
 th
e 
St
at
e 
D
ut
y 
to
 p
ro
te
ct
 h
um
an
 ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 th
e 
St
at
e-
bu
sin
es
s n
ex
us
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
15
, n
. 2
, 2
01
8 
p.
 4
1-
63
46
the UN Working Group has noted that ‘the current lack 
of  attention paid to the human rights impact and the 
responsibilities’ of  entities that are connected with the 
State and ‘the duty of  Governments that own or con-
trol them’ in this area is ‘striking.’27 This has prompted 
the UN Working Group to issue a report with specific 
recommendations to States about how to integrate the 
UNGPs in the activities and operations of  entities that 
are owned and controlled by the State.28 The contents 
of  this report will be examined in in Sections 3 and 4 of  
this Article, which deal in detail with the content State-
-business nexus under the UNGPs. However, firstly it is 
required to determine which actors might fall within the 
ambit of  the State-business nexus.
2. who ARe the ActoRs thAt fAll wIthIn the 
AmbIt of the ungps stAte-busIness nexus?
7. When performing research on State ownership 
and the role of  the State as an economic actor, one may 
encounter myriad different definitions and terminolo-
gies such as ‘sovereign wealth funds’, ‘government com-
pany’, ‘national oil company’, ‘state trading company’, 
‘canalizing agencies’, ‘export credit agencies’, ‘State-
-owned multinational enterprise’, ‘official investment 
insurance or guarantee agencies’, ‘development agen-
cies’, ‘development finance institutions’, etc. Even the 
term ‘state-owned enterprise’ is considered as providing 
only ‘an approximate description of  the complexity of  
forms and organisations that State companies may as-
sume’ and which have reached ‘an apogee of  fantasy 
and ingenuity in terminology and legal forms.’29  For 
example, State-owned multinational enterprises have 
been defined by UNCTAD as ‘separate legal entities 
established or acquired by governments to engage in 
commercial activities, including FDI operations, by way 
of  having affiliates abroad or engaging in non-equity 
27  INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS 
(IHRB). Letter to the Members of  the G20 Employment Working Group. 
24 mar. 2017. p. 6.
28  Leading by Example: The State, State-Owned Enterprises and 
Human Rights (UNITED NATIONS. General Assembly. Human 
Right Council. Leading by example: the state, state-owned enterprises 
and human rights: report of  the working group on the issue of  hu-
man rights and transnational corporations and other business enter-
prises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45)
29  TONINELLI, Pierangelo Maria. The rise and fall of  state-owned 
enterprise in the western world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000. p. 4-5.
modes’ and in which the government has at least a 10 
percent ownership share.30 Sovereign wealth funds are 
‘funds established, owned and controlled by local or 
central governments’, and which acquire ‘equity inte-
rests in companies listed in international markets, ope-
rating in sectors considered as strategic by their country 
of  incorporation.’31 Sovereign wealth funds are some 
of  the largest and most important economic actors that 
exist today32 and they have played a key role in the stabi-
lisation of  the markets during the 2007 financial crisis.33 
Export credit agencies are ‘publicly funded and gover-
nment-owned “institutions that support and subsidize 
national trade and investment activities, particularly in 
developing and emerging markets.”’34 National oil com-
panies are also extremely important economic actors 
in this context, since they own and control the world 
energy supply,35 and their activities are not necessarily 
limited to operations within national borders.36 
8. Despite their varied terminology, and the fact 
that some of  those entities engage in economic activi-
ties directly, as State-owned enterprises and national oil 
companies do, while others are only passive investors 
30  UNITED NATIONS. World investment report 2017: investment 
and the digital economy. 2017. (n. 20). p. 30.
31  BASSAN, Fabio. The law of  sovereign wealth funds. Edward Elgar, 
2011. p. 32.
32  SOVEREIGN wealth fund rankings: SWFI: Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute. Available at: <https://www.swfinstitute.org/sover-
eign-wealth-fund-rankings/>. For example, as of  20 June 2018, the 
assets under the management of  sovereign wealth funds has reached 
USD 7,861.65 trillion. 
33  BACKER, Larry Catá. Sovereign investing in times of  crisis: 
global regulation of  sovereign wealth funds, state owned enterprises 
and the chinese experience. Transnational Law & Contemporary Prob-
lems, v. 19, n. 1, 2009. p. 4, 15.   
34  CAN, Özgür; SECK, Sara L. The legal obligations with respect to 
human rights and export credit agencies: final legal discussion paper: july 
2006. Ottawa: Halifax Intiative Coalition, 2006. p. 23. Available at: 
<http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/content/legal-obligations-re-
spect-human-rights-and-export-credit-agencies-june-23-2006>. Ac-
cessed: 20 jun. 2018; GIANTURCO, Delio E. Export credit agencies: 
the unsung giants of  international trade and finance. Santa Barbára: 
Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001. p. 1.
35  HULTS, David R.; VICTOR, David G.; THURBER, Mark 
(Ed.). Oil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the world en-
ergy supply. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 3.
36  NATIONAL oil companies: beyond boundaries, beyond bor-
ders: an emerging class of  multinational oil companies is changing 
the competitive landscape. Available at:  <http://www.bain.com/
publications/articles/national-oil-companies-beyond-boundaries.
aspx>.; Mohammed Aly Sergie, ‘Qatar Petroleum Expanding Over-
seas With Focus on Production’ (Bloomberg.com) <http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-23/qatar-petroleum-eyes-
foreign-expansion-after-restructuring>. Accessed: 7 Nov. 2015.
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in other entities, as is the case for sovereign wealth fun-
ds and export credit agencies, all those entities share a 
common characteristic: a sovereign State owns them. 
From the perspective of  the UNGPs this is an impor-
tant issue given that initially Professor Ruggie only re-
ferred to ‘State-owned enterprises’, in his first report 
that included references to what would ultimately be-
come Principles 4, 5 and 6 of  the State-business nexus. 
37 Based on this, could it be the case that the UNGPs 
only apply to State-owned enterprises, thus excluding 
from its sphere of  applications any other entities that 
are State-owned, such as sovereign wealth funds or ex-
port credit agencies? While a recent report prepared 
by the UN Working Group focuses mainly on State-
-owned enterprises, it also notes that sovereign wealth 
funds, export credit agencies and other similar entities 
can have the potential to impact human rights.38 Fur-
thermore, Principle 4 of  the UNGPs refers to ‘business 
enterprises that are owned or controlled by the State or 
that receive substantial support and services from State 
agencies such as export credit agencies and official investment 
insurance or guarantee agencies.’ The Commentary to the 
UNGPs further clarifies that the UNGPs are applica-
ble to ‘business enterprises controlled by the State’ and also to 
‘a range of  agencies linked formally or informally to the 
State’ and which ‘may provide support and services to 
business activities.’39 Consequently, this means that the 
UNGPs would apply to all entities that are owned and 
controlled by the State, regardless of  the formal way in 
which those entities are legally structured. As such, for 
the remainder of  this article, all entities that are owned 
or controlled by the State, will be simply referred as Sta-
te-owned entities (SOEs). This approach thus seeks to 
overcome, what certain leading scholars have called the 
37  RUGGIE, John G. Promotion and protection of  human rights: in-
terim report of  the special representative of  the secretary-general 
on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises. 2006. (E/CN.4/2006/97). p. 20.
38  ‘Leading by Example: The State, State-Owned Enterprises and 
Human Rights (UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Pro-
motion and protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights, including the right to development: report of  the working 
group on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45)’ (n. 28) p. 
6-7.
39  RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
implementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. (n. 2). p. 9.
‘mania for compartimentalisation’,40 that is encountered 
when one deals with the regulation of  State ownership, 
despite the fact that such ‘compartimentalisation’ can 
only be justified for ‘static purposes.’41 
9. This makes sense, because the State, as an econo-
mic actor, should be a model corporate citizen, regar-
dless of  the way in which the entity, though which the 
State conducts the economic activity in that particular 
case, is ultimately structured from a legal point of  view. 
To be sure, there will be differences in how the UNGPs 
would be implemented in the operations of  sovereign 
wealth funds (since these entities operate principally as 
passive investors), when compared to the implementa-
tion of  the UNGPs in the activities of  a State-owned 
enterprise.  For example, State-owned enterprises could 
have on-the-ground operations in conflict-affected 
areas and Principle 7 of  the UNGPs specifically addres-
ses the risk of  gross human rights abuses in this situa-
tion, by requiring engagement with the business enter-
prises from ‘the earliest stage possible.’42
3. thRee peRspectIves on the ungps And 
the stAte-busIness nexus
10. The UNGPs offer three perspectives on the Sta-
te-business nexus in Pillar I; Principles 4, 5 and 6, under 
the State duty to protect human rights. The first perspective 
is that covered by Principle 4 of  the UNGPs and which 
states that:
States should take additional steps to protect against 
human rights abuses by business enterprises that are 
owned or controlled by the State, or that receive substantial 
support and services from State agencies such as export 
credit agencies and official investment insurance or 
guarantee agencies, including, where appropriate, 
by requiring human rights due diligence.43
40  BACKER, Larry Catá. The human rights obligations of  State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs): emerging conceptual structures and 
principles in national and international law and policy. Vanderbilt 
Journal of  Transnational Law, v. 51, 2017. Available at:  <https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2980533>. p. 12.
41  BOLTON, Patrick; SAMAMA, Frederic; STIGLITZ, Joseph 
E. (Ed.). Sovereign wealth funds and long-term investing. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2012. p. 210. 
42  BACKER, Larry Catá. Corporate social responsibility in weak 
governance zones. Santa Clara J. Int’l L. v. 14, n. 297, p. 297-323, 
2016. Available at: <http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/
vol14/iss1/10>. See in this context also Principle 7 of  the UNGPs.
43  RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
implementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” 
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11. Consequently, Principle 4 of  the UNGPs 
addresses the State ownership function directly as well 
as indirectly. The role of  the direct State ownership func-
tion is evidenced by the first half  of  Principle 4, which 
provides that States must take ‘additional steps to pro-
tect against human rights abuses’ by all businesses that 
have a connection with the State, either by virtue of  
the fact that the State owns that business, or in circums-
tances where the State controls that entity. The focus on 
ownership and control means that the approach taken 
by the UNGPs in this context is broad and – to a cer-
tain extent – mirrors the rules of  State responsibility 
found in general international law, as codified by the 
ILC Articles,44 as discussed further below. For example, 
the fact that States may be held responsible for human 
rights violations that have been perpetrated by entities 
that engage in business activities on behalf  of  the Sta-
te, is well established and undisputed, as among others, 
the jurisprudence of  the European Court of  Human 
Rights shows.45 Nevertheless, State responsibility does 
not operate automatically and just because an entity is 
owned by a State, it does not mean that a State is directly 
responsible for the acts of  those entities in all circums-
tances. For State responsibility to arise three elements 
must be satisfied. Firstly, there must be an internationally 
wrongful act or omission. Secondly, that act or omission 
must constitute a breach of  an international obligation of  the 
State in question. Thirdly, the international wrongful act 
must be attributable to the State under the international 
law rules of  State responsibility, as codified by the ILC 
Articles. As far as the first element is concerned, Arti-
cle 1 of  the ILC Articles states that ‘every international 
wrongful act entails the international responsibility of  
that State.’ In this context, the net is cast wide and Sta-
te responsibility could arise for any acts or omissions that 
may be contrary to the obligations of  that State under 
international law, including human rights violations.46 The 
second element is satisfied if  a breach of  an internatio-
framework: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. (Emphasis added.). p. 9. 
44  DRAFT articles on responsibility of  states for internationally 
wrongful acts. 2001.
45  CASE of  Heinisch v Germany. ECtHR, 2008. (Application 
n. 28274/08, Judgment 21 July 2011); CASE of  Fadeyeva v Russia. 
ECHR, 2005. (Application n. 55723/00, 9 June 2005); CASE of  
Dubetska & ors v Ukraine. ECHR, 2003. (Application n. 30499/03); 
CASE of  Yershova v Russia. ECHR, 2004. (Application n. 1387/04, 
8 April 2010)
46  CRAWFORD, James. State responsibility: the general part. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014. (1. Paperback ed.). p. 219-220. 
nal obligation occurs in that case. Article 12 of  the ILC 
Articles states that a breach is an ‘act or omission’ which 
‘is not in conformity with what is required of  it by that 
obligation.’47 
12. As far as attribution is concerned – and thus the 
satisfaction of  the third element – the ILC Articles have 
specific provisions that deal with attribution in Articles 
4, 5 and 8.48 Under Article 4 of  the ILC Articles, attribu-
tion is based on the status of  an entity as a State organ. 
In this circumstance, if  a SOE is given the status of  a 
State organ under the domestic law of  a given State,49 or 
is found to act as a de facto State organ,50 all the acts of  
that entity will be automatically attributable to the State, 
without any further inquiry, by virtue of  the operation 
of  the principle of  the unity of  the State, all the acts of  
the various organs, agencies and instrumentalities are 
considered to be ultimately those of  the State in ques-
tion.51 However, it should also be recalled that under the 
ILC rules of  State responsibility, mere ownership alone 
by the State of  a SOE is not sufficient to attribute the 
acts of  that entity to the State in question or to make it a 
State organ52 because, in international law, separate legal 
47  UNITED NATIONS. International Law Commission. Draft 
articles on responsibility of  states for internationally wrongful acts, with com-
mentaries. 2008. Available at: <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instru-
ments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf>. p. 55. (‘The phrase 
“not in conformity with” is flexible enough to cover the many dif-
ferent ways in which an obligation can be expressed, as well as the 
various forms which a breach may take.’)
48  DRAFT articles on responsibility of  states for internationally 
wrongful acts. 2001. (n. 44); UNITED NATIONS. International 
Law Commission. Draft articles on responsibility of  states for internation-
ally wrongful acts, with commentaries. 2008. Available at: <http://legal.
un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.
pdf>. p. 38-49.
49  UNITED NATIONS. International Law Commission. Draft 
articles on responsibility of  states for internationally wrongful acts, with com-
mentaries. 2008. Available at: <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instru-
ments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf>. p. 42. The Com-
mentary clarifies that the term ‘person or entity’ is used in the 
broadest sense to include ‘any person or entity.’
50  UNITED NATIONS. International Law Commission. Draft 
articles on responsibility of  states for internationally wrongful acts, with com-
mentaries. 2008. Available at: <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instru-
ments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf>. (‘The State ‘cannot 
avoid responsibility for the conduct of  a body which does in truth 
act as one of  its organs merely by denying it that status under its 
own law [and consequently,] each case will have to be dealt with on 
the basis of  its own facts and circumstances.’)
51  UNITED NATIONS. International Law Commission. Draft 
articles on responsibility of  states for internationally wrongful acts, with com-
mentaries. 2008. Available at: <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instru-
ments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf>. p. 35.
52  Jaemin Lee, ‘State Responsibility and Government-Affiliated 
Entities in International Economic Law: The Danger of  Blurring 
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personality is generally observed, bar a finding of  fraud 
or other malfeasance.53 Consequently, with the focus in 
the UNGPs being on ownership and control Principle 4 
would apply to all SOEs that are owned by the State. 
This ultimately means that States would have to ensu-
re they take ‘additional steps to protect against human 
rights abuses’ in all circumstances, including in cases 
where the State is merely a shareholder and does not ac-
tually exercise any control over the business in question.
13. Attribution under Article 5 is based not on status, 
but on the exercise of  governmental authority. Under Arti-
cle 5 what is important is the exercise of  governmental 
authority in that particular instance. Given that States 
can delegate the performance of  certain activities that 
ultimately involve the exercise of  governmental autho-
rity – such as policing and the maintenance of  security 
and which are increasingly being performed by private 
entities – it was felt that States ‘should not be able to 
evade their responsibility’ as a matter of  international 
law, by delegating those functions to privately-owned 
entities.54 Consequently, under Article 5 of  the ILC Ar-
ticles, States can be responsible for the acts or omis-
sions of  fully private, as well as State-owned entities, as 
long as in that particular instance, there was an exercise 
of  governmental authority. The provisions of  Article 5 
of  the ILC are thus mirrored by Principle 5 of  the UN-
GPs which, as discussed below, was designed to ensure 
that States exercise adequate oversight over all man-
ner of  entities (including private entities) that may be 
exercising elements of  governmental authority, in cases 
where, for instance, previously State-owned businesses 
and functions associated with the State, such as the pro-
vision of  basic services, have been privatised. 
14. Under Article 8 of  the ILC Articles, and which 
is likely to cover most SOEs, States are responsible for 
the acts or omissions of  the entities that are under the 
the Chinese Wall between ‘State Organ’and ‘Non-State Organ’as 
Designed in the ILC Draft Articles’ (2015) 49 Journal of  World 
Trade 117, 117.
LEE, Jaemin. State responsibility and government-affiliated entities 
in international economic law: the danger of  blurring the chinese 
wall between ‘state organ’and ‘non-state organ’as designed in the ilc 
draft articles. Journal of  World Trade, v. 49, Issue 1, 2015. p. 117.
53  CASE Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Com-
pany, Limited: Belgium v Spain. Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970. p. 3. 
[56].
54  UNITED NATIONS. International Law Commission. Draft 
articles on responsibility of  states for internationally wrongful acts, with com-
mentaries. 2008. Available at: <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instru-
ments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf>. p. 42. 
direction and control of  the State thus reflecting the ele-
ment of  control present in Principle 4 of  the UNGPs. 
While the tests for attribution of  acts or omissions that 
may fall under the scope of  Article 8 of  the ILC is ba-
sed on ‘effective control’ being exercised over the entity 
in question – and which as indicated in jurisprudence 
is exceedingly onerous55 – some scholars have noted 
that a lower standard of  control may be required un-
der international human rights law.56  For example Leo 
R. Hertzberg, Ulf  Mansson, Astrid Nikula and Marko and 
Tuovi v Finland was a case heard by the Human Rights 
Committee under Article 19 of  the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (freedom of  
expression), Articles 1 (right of  the to receive commu-
nications from a State party) and Article 2 (exhaustion 
of  domestic remedies) of  the Optional Protocol of  the 
ICCPR.57 The authors of  the Communication complai-
ned that the Finnish authorities, including organs of  the 
State-owned and controlled Finnish Broadcasting Com-
pany, interfered with their right to freedom of  expres-
sion by imposing sanctions or censoring participants in 
radio and TV programmes that dealt with homosexua-
55  INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. Military and para-
military activities in and against Nicaragua: Nicaragua v United States 
of  America. Merits, Judgment ICJ Reports 1986. p. 14. [116]; AP-
PLICATION of  the International Convention on the Elimination 
of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination: Georgia v Russian Federation. 
Provisional Measures (No 2008/35). 15 oct. 2008. [400]. (For exam-
ple, in Nicaragua, the International Court of  Justice said that: The 
Court has taken the view … that United States participation, even 
if  preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, 
supplying and equipping of  the contras, the selection of  its military 
or paramilitary targets, and the planning of  the whole of  its op-
eration, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of  the evidence in 
the possession of  the Court, for the purpose of  attributing to the 
United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of  
their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. All the forms 
of  United States participation mentioned above, and even the gen-
eral control by the respondent State over a force with a high degree 
of  dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, without further 
evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetra-
tion of  the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law al-
leged by the applicant State. Such acts could well be committed by 
members of  the contras without the control of  the United States. 
For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of  the United 
States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had 
effective control of  the military or paramilitary operations of  which 
the alleged violations were committed.’)
56  MCCORQUODALE, Robert. The impact of  international 
human rights law on state responsibility. In:  KAMMINGA, Menno; 
SCHEININ, M. (Ed.). The impact of  human rights on general international 
law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 235-254.
57  HERTZBERG, Leo et al. V. Finland: communication n. 
61/1979, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985), at page 124, paragraph 
91). University of  Minnesota, [1985].
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lity. In its analysis of  the merits of  the Communication, 
the Human Rights Committee started ‘from the premi-
se that the State party is responsible for the action of  
the Finish Broadcasting Company (FBC), in which the 
State holds a dominant stake (90 percent) and which 
is placed under specific government control.’58  While 
ultimately the Human Rights Committee held that there 
was no violation in this case, it is interesting to note that 
it started its analysis from the premise that by virtue of  its 
State ownership of  the FBC, Finland was responsible 
its actions. 
15. Another important point to consider is the fact 
that UNGP 4 seems to focus on ownership broadly, whi-
ch means that Principle 4 would be equally applicable in 
cases where the State is the full or majority owner of  a 
SOE, as well as in those cases where the State is a mino-
rity shareholder. The focus in the second half  of  Prin-
ciple 4 of  the UNGPs on the indirect State ownership 
function reinforces this conclusion. That is, Principle 
4 of  the UNGPs would be applicable not only where 
the State owns or controls a given entity, but also in cases 
where completely independent business entities receive 
support and services from a SOE. The Commentaries to 
the UNGPs clarify this when they state that: 
Where these agencies do not explicitly consider 
the actual and potential adverse impacts on 
human rights of  beneficiary enterprises, they 
put themselves at risk – in reputational, financial, 
political and potentially legal terms – for supporting 
such harm, and they may add to the human rights 
challenges faced by the recipient State.59
16. The second perspective on the State-business nexus 
is provided by Principle 5 of  the UNGPs and provides 
that ‘States must exercise adequate oversight in order to 
meet their international human rights obligations when 
they contract with, or legislate for, business enterprises 
to provide services that may impact on upon the enjoy-
ment of  human rights.’60 Although not directly apparent 
58  HERTZBERG, Leo et al. V. Finland: communication n. 
61/1979, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985), at page 124, paragraph 
91). University of  Minnesota, [1985].
59  RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
implementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. (n. 2). p. 9.
60  RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
implementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. (n. 2). p. 9.
from its text, the Commentary explains that Principle 5 
applies to those situations where the State has privati-
sed the delivery of  certain services ‘which may have an 
impact upon the enjoyment of  human rights’, meaning 
that States must adequately oversee the activities of  
those enterprises by providing ‘adequate independent 
monitoring and accountability mechanisms.’61 Conse-
quently, this shows that the State was once an owner, 
but has, in the meantime, privatised the provision of  
certain services, does not seem to dilute or diminish the 
obligations that States have to continually regulate and 
oversee those entities. The approach of  Principle 5 of  
the UNGPs resonates with a considerable amount of  
academic research that has been undertaken concerning 
the adverse affects that privatisation could have on hu-
man rights, especially in sectors such as the provision of  
basic services, health, education, social security: 
Taking into account this idea of  the state as the 
ultimate entity vested with human rights obligations, 
it is obvious that the state has the duty to impose 
limits and conditions upon privatisations. This duty 
leads to the need to take a human rights approach 
to privatisation; human rights concerns must be 
present in every process of  privatisation from the 
very beginning. There are two aspects in which 
the state can take part; first of  all, the decision to 
privatise a given service that affects human rights 
obligations and second, the functioning of  the 
service once it has been privatised.62
17. The third and last perspective on the State-business 
nexus is dealt with in Principle 6 of  the UNGPs, which 
states that ‘States should promote respect for human 
rights by business enterprises with which they conduct 
 RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: im-
plementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” frame-
work: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-general 
on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises. (n. 2). p. 10.
 RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: im-
plementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” frame-
work: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-general 
on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises. (n. 2).
61  RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
implementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. (n. 2).
62  FEYTER, Koen de; ISA, Felipe Gómes. Privatisation and hu-
man rights in the age of  globalisation. [S.l.]: Intersentia, 2005. (Maastricht 
Series in Human Rights). p. 18; LUSTIG, Doreen; BENVENISTI, 
Eyal. The multinational corporation as ‘the good despot’: the democratic 
costs of  privatisation in global settings. 2013. Available at: <http://
globaltrust.tau.ac.il/publications>.
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commercial transactions.’63 The scope of  Principle 6 
can be ascertained from the Commentary again, which 
draws attention to the fact that States conduct a ‘variety 
of  commercial transactions with business enterprises, 
not at least through their procurement activities.’ The 
fact that the focus is on the totality of  the commercial 
transactions in which a State may enter can be inferred 
from the use of  the words ‘not at least’ present in the 
Commentary to the UNGPs. Thus, while the UNGPs 
acknowledge that procurement activities is one of  the 
main forms in which States may engage with other bu-
sinesses in commercial transactions, procurement is not 
by any means the only such method. For instance, Sta-
tes may enter into a multitude of  commercial transac-
tions as vendors of  raw materials, or they may provide 
products (such as bonds or currencies) and services 
(such as labour) to businesses generally.64 Those tran-
sactions would also fall within the ambit of  Principle 
6. For example, one way through which States could 
practically implement the requirement of  Principle 6 of  
the UNGPs is by ensuring that adequate consideration 
is given to human rights risks by integrating relevant 
contractual clauses in all contracts to which the State or 
SOEs are parties.65 That being said, procurement is still 
one of  the main areas through which States can ultima-
tely influence the conduct of  other businesses, as far as 
the integration of  human rights considerations in their 
activities is concerned, simply because State bureaucra-
63  RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
implementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. p. 10.
 RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: im-
plementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” frame-
work: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-general 
on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises. p. 9.
 RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: im-
plementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” frame-
work: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-general 
on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises. (n. 2).p. 9. (Emphasis added.)
64  INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS. 
State of  play: human rights in the political economy of  states: avenues 
for application. IHRB, 2014. Available at: <https://www.ihrb.org/
pdf/2014-03-18_State-of-Play_HR-Political-Economy-States.pdf>.
65  RUGGIE, John G. Principles for responsible contracts: integrating 
the management of  human rights risks into state-investor contract 
negotiations: guidance for negotiators: report of  the special repre-
sentative of  the secretary- general on the issue of  human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises. 2011 (A/
HRC/17/31/Add.3)
cies are some of  the largest consumers of  goods and 
services. For example, worldwide public procurement 
is worth EUR 1 trillion per year in trade flows, while in 
the EU alone, this figure amounts to EUR 425 billion, 
or approximately 3.4% of  EU GDP.66 The EU Public 
Procurement Directives67 are some of  the latest efforts 
to ensure that Member States ‘implement a range of  
preventative, monitoring and capacity building actions, 
necessary to respond to the expectations’ laid out in the 
UNGPs.68 The EU Public Procurement Directives seek 
to integrate human rights considerations across all pha-
ses of  the procurement process, such as in pre-tender 
and in the market engagement phases, in the technical 
specifications phase, and in the selection, award and 
contracting phases. For example, all bidders that have 
failed to pay the required social security contributions,69 
or that have been convicted of  child labour or other 
forms of  trafficking,70 or that do not comply with envi-
ronmental, social and labour law obligations would be 
excluded from the tender process.71
18. This section has analysed the State-business ne-
xus as covered by Principles 4, 5 and 6 of  the UNGPs. 
It has shown that, by offering three perspectives on the 
State-business nexus, the UNGPs approach this con-
cept very broadly. This approach is to a certain extent 
mirrored by the ILC Articles, which also seek to en-
sure that States are unable to avoid accountability by 
delegating functions that are normally associated with 
the State or through the outright control of  private en-
66  INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS. 
Protecting rights by purchasing right: the human rights provisions, op-
portunities and limitations under the 2014 EU public procurement 
directives. IHRB: London, 2015. (Occassional paper series paper 
number 3). p. 8.
67  DIRECTIVE 2014/23/EU of  the European Parliament and 
of  the Council of  26 February 2014 on the award of  concession con-
tracts [OJ L 94/1 (28 March 2014) (the “Concessions Directive”)] 
20142014; DIRECTIVE 2014/24/EU of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of  26 February 2014 on public procurement and 
repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [OJ L 94/65 (28 March 2014) (the 
“Public Sector Directive”)]. 2014; DIRECTIVE 2014/25/EU of  
the European Parliament and of  the Council of  26 February 2014 
on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport 
and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC [OJ 
L 94/243 (28 March 2014) (the “Utilities Directive”)].
68  Institute for Human Rights and Business (n. 67) 9.
69  Public Sector Directive Art. 57(2); Recital 105 and 106 of  the 
Utilities Directive; Art. 38(5) of  the Concessions Directive.  
70  Public Sector Directive Art. 57(1)(f); Utilities Directive Art. 80; 
Art. 38(4)(f) of  the Concessions Directive.  
71  Public Sector Directive Art. 57(4)(a); Utilities Directive Art. 
80; Art. 38(7)(a) of  the Concessions Directive.  
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tities. Under the UNGPs, the State has a duty to take 
‘additional steps’ to ensure that the businesses that are 
directly and indirectly connected with the State protect 
against human rights abuses (UNGP Principle 4). Fur-
thermore, just because a State was once the owner of  a 
business does not mean that the obligations of  the State 
to ensure that adequate oversight with regard to human 
rights, ended on the moment of  privatisation (UNGP 
Principle 5). Consequently, States’ obligations in this 
context are continuous. States should also ensure that 
other businesses with whom they conduct commercial 
transactions respect human rights, and for this purpose 
the net is cast wide to include the totality of  the commercial 
transactions to which States or SOEs may become parties 
as vendors or purchasers (UNGP Principle 6). 
4. the content of the stAte duty to pRotect 
humAn RIghts In the context of the stAte-
busIness nexus
19. Having considered the range of  actors to whom 
the State-business nexus may be applicable, as well as 
the scope of  this concept, which was approached from 
three perspectives, this section seeks to further analyse 
the content of  the State duty to protect human rights in 
the context of  the State-business nexus. For this purpo-
se it will argue that the content of  the State duty to pro-
tect human rights in the context of  the State-business 
nexus is composed of  two elements. The first element 
is the requirement to take ‘additional steps’ to protect 
against human rights abuses by businesses that are con-
nected directly or indirectly with the State. The second 
element requires States to ensure that SOEs perform 
human rights due diligence on all their operations and 
activities, an element that could be considered as for-
ming an integral part of  the States’ broader due dili-
gence obligation to prevent human rights violations and 
which is generally required by international law..
4.1. The first element: the requirement to take 
‘additional steps’ by States as far as their SOEs 
are concerned
20.It should be noted that when the State-business 
nexus is considered, apart from UNGPs 4, 5 and 6, it is 
clear that other Principles may come into play, such as 
the foundational principles outlined in UNGP 1, which 
deals with the general State duty to protect human ri-
ghts; UNGP 2 which requires States to ensure that the 
‘expectation’ that all business enterprises domiciled in 
their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights 
throughout their operations (a Principle which, through 
its policy-setting function, has the potential to influence 
corporate culture);  UNGP 3, which sets out the State’s 
general regulatory and policy function; and UNGP 8, 
which urges States to ensure that adequate ‘policy co-
herence is achieved vertically as well as horizontally. 
For example, the Commentary to the UNGP clarifies 
the meaning of  the expected policy coherence in the 
following way: 
Vertical policy coherence entails States having the 
necessary policies, laws and processes to implement 
their international human rights law obligations. 
Horizontal policy coherence means supporting 
and equipping departments and agencies, at both 
the national and subnational levels, that shape 
business practices – including those responsible for 
corporate law and securities regulation, investment, 
export credit and insurance, trade and labour – to 
be informed of  and act in a manner compatible 
with the Governments’ human rights.72
21. But bearing in mind that in the context of  the 
State-business nexus, States must take ‘additional steps’ 
to ensure that the entities that are directly or indirectly 
connected with the State do not perpetrate human ri-
ghts abuses, what is the ultimate meaning of  this term? 
What sort of  ‘additional steps’ must States take in this 
regard that they would not usually have to take in the 
context of  all corporations that are domiciled in their 
territory or jurisdiction? Does the inclusion of  the re-
quirement for ‘additional steps’, within the ambit of  
Principle 4 of  the UNGPs, mean that more is expected 
from States? While there is nothing in scholarship that 
explicitly deals with this question, or anywhere in the 
UNGPs, the UN Working Group has dealt with this 
issue from two perspectives. 
22. Firstly, during 2015 and 2016, the Working Group 
issued a report to the Human Rights Council that that 
focused on the State duty to protect human rights in the 
context of  the State-business nexus titled ‘Leading by 
example – The State, State-owned enterprises, and Hu-
72  RUGGIE, John G. Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
implementing the united nations “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework: report of  the special representative of  the secretary-
general on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises. (n. 2). p. 12.
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man Rights’ (‘Report’).73 This Report gives the following 
reasons why ‘additional steps’ must be taken by States in 
this area: ‘policy coherence, legal obligations, reputation 
and credibility.’74 While the issue of  policy coherence 
and the State’s legal obligations as a matter of  interna-
tional law in light of  the ILC Articles have already been 
covered above, as far as reputation and credibility are 
concerned, the situation can be framed by asking the 
following question: if  States are unwilling to ensure that 
the businesses that they own or control, or with whom 
they engage in commercial transactions respect human 
rights, then how could States expect any better from the 
private sector? In this context, this Report outlines the 
normative and policy framework that should underpin 
State action in relation to human rights, by examining 
the State duty to protect,75 the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights,76 the link between corporate 
governance and human rights,77 urges SOEs to ‘lead by 
example’ and makes suggestions how the requirement 
to take ‘additional steps’ might be operationalized.78 
The mechanics for operationalising the ‘additional 
steps’ focus on specific areas that target mainly issues 
of  strategy and corporate governance. For example, the 
Report suggests that Sates: (i) set out clearly what ex-
73  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45)
74  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 1.
75  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 7.
76  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 9.
77  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 10.
78  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 12-21.
pectations they have from SOEs in the area of  human 
rights and have mechanisms in place to manage those 
expectations;79 (ii) ensure that the relationship between 
the company boards and the State is clarified;80 (iii) en-
sure that there are oversight and follow up mechanisms 
in place for SOEs;81 (iv) aim for capacity building in this 
area;82 (v) require human rights due diligence as well as 
disclosure, transparency and reporting mechanisms are 
put in place;83 (vi) ensure effective remedy.84  A handful 
of  States have already started to make changes in this 
sense. For example, Sweden has recently changed its 
Official State Ownership Policy and has included busi-
ness sustainability among some of  its key targets. The 
Policy states that ‘State-owned enterprises should act 
as role models within the area of  sustainable business 
and should otherwise behave in a manner that promo-
tes public confidence.’85 The UNGPs as well as other 
corporate social responsibility initiatives such as the 
OECD Guidelines, Global Compact and the goals of  
the Agenda 2030 are specifically integrated in the Swe-
79  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 12.
80  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 14-15.
81  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 16.
82  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 17.
83  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 17-18.
84  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45). p. 19.
85  GOVERNMENT OFFICES OF SWEDEN. Ministry of  
Enterprise and Innovation. The state’s ownership policy and guidelines for 
state-owned enterprises 2017. Available at: <https://www.government.
se/reports/2017/06/the-states-ownership-policy-and-guidelines-
for-state-owned-enterprises-2017/>. p. 4. 
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dish State Ownership Policy.86 Norway has made similar 
progress in this context and the aim of  the Norwegian 
Government is for State ownership ‘to be an example 
of  best practice internationally,’ and SOEs must act as 
‘exemplary’ corporate citizens in four areas: climate and 
the environment, human rights, employee and worker 
rights and anticorruption.87 Norway’s State Ownership 
Policy also integrates the UNGPs and there is a clear 
expectation from all SOEs to ensure that human rights 
are respected not only in their own operations but also 
by their business partners.88
23.Secondly, the UN Working Group has recently an-
nounced that it will currently focus on the ‘operation 
of  “economic diplomacy tools” such as export credit, 
investment guarantees, export promotion and trade 
missions, as well as public procurement’, with the ulti-
mate aim to develop concrete recommendations to be 
presented to the Human Rights Council in 2018. Those 
recommendations will be focusing on the requirement 
of  the UNGPs for States to take ‘additional steps’ in or-
der to ensure the protection and promotion of  human 
rights in the ‘State-business nexus’.89 The latest recom-
mendations were published at the time of  writing this 
article, but overall the two initiatives seems to suggest 
that, at least at UN level, a new paradigm is now for-
ming, whereby more is expected from SOEs than from 
privately-owned corporations as far as the responsibility 
to respect human rights is concerned. In this context, 
some scholars have remarked that SOEs ‘occupy a dual 
86  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Concil. Promotion and 
protection of  all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development: report of  the working group on 
the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. 2016. (A/HRC/32/45).
87  NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF TRADE, INDUSTRY AND 
FISCHERIES. Diverse and value-creating ownership: Meld. St. 27 
(2013–2014): report to the storting (white paper): recommendation 
of  the Ministry of  Trade, Industry and Fisheries of  20 june 2014, 
approved in the Council of  State the same day. 2014. (The Solberg 
Government) <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/
meld.-st.-27-2013-2014/id763968/>.
88  NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF TRADE, INDUSTRY AND 
FISCHERIES. Diverse and value-creating ownership: Meld. St. 27 
(2013-2014): report to the storting (white paper): recommendation 
of  the Ministry of  Trade, Industry and Fisheries of  20 june 2014, 
approved in the Council of  State the same day. 2014. (The Solberg 
Government) <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/
meld.-st.-27-2013-2014/id763968/>. p.  84.  
89  UN WORKING GROUP ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS. The state as an economic actor and human rights: further 
unpacking practical implications of  international business and hu-
man rights principles for the “state-business nexus”.[S.l.:s.n., 20--?]
place within the UNGPs’, in that they may be conside-
red as instrumentalities of  the State and thus ‘poten-
tially subject to the State duty to protect’ while at the 
same time they are ‘commercial ventures being subject 
to the corporate responsibility to respect.’90 This means 
that in the case of  SOEs, all Pillars of  the UNGPs may 
be applicable concomitantly since as Principle 14 of  the 
UNGPs states ‘the responsibility of  business enterpri-
ses to respect human rights applies to all enterprises 
regardless of  their size, sector, operational context, ow-
nership and structure.’ However, a further differentiation 
seems to be made by the UN Working between SOEs 
and privately owned entities when it states that ‘in addi-
tion to’ to the responsibility of  SOEs to respect human 
rights, they are expected to observe ‘the highest standar-
ds of  business conduct on par with listed companies.’91 
However, despite the focus in this article on SOEs, the 
UN Working Group has clarified that, just because Sta-
tes may have to take ‘additional steps’ to ensure that 
SOEs respect human rights, this does not mean that 
States should be less concerned with the activities of  
privately-owned entities:
This does not mean that States should pay less 
attention to ensuring respect for human rights by 
fully private enterprises. The ultimate goal is the 
full respect for human rights by all enterprises, 
irrespective of  size, sector, operational context, 
structure or ownership. As States work towards 
that goal, there are still persuasive reasons for them 
to lead by example. This will only strengthen their 
legitimacy in setting regulations and expectations 
towards private businesses.92
4.2. The second element: due diligence 
‘requirements’ by SOEs as a integral element of 
States’ due diligence obligations
24. This section deals with the second element of  
the content of  States’ obligations to protect human ri-
ghts in the context of  the State-business nexus. That 
is, in accordance with Principle 4, States may ‘require’ 
their SOEs to perform human rights due diligence on 
their operations, ‘where’ this is considered as an ‘appro-
priate’ step. Consequently, it is clear that as it currently 
90  BACKER, Larry Catá. The human rights obligations of  State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). (n. 18). p. 1-2.
91  ‘Leading by Example: The State, State-Owned Enterprises 
and Human Rights (Report of  the Working Group on the Issue of  
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises). (n. 28). p. 10.
92  Human Rights Council (n. 74). p. 21.
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stands, this ‘requirement’ is not mandatory because of  
the presence of  the words ‘where appropriate.’ However, 
even if  those words would not have been included in 
UNGP Principle 4, it is unlikely that States would have 
been ‘required’ to perform mandatory due diligence on 
all the operations of  their SOEs. As explained in the 
introduction to this article, the UNGPs are a ‘soft law’ 
instrument that do not create any hard obligations, but 
may ultimately influence States as well as corporations 
to change their behaviour.93 Nevertheless, the require-
ments that States must take ‘additional steps’ under Prin-
ciple 4 of  the UNGPs have to be viewed in light of  
the broader obligations to ‘protect, respect and fulfill’94 
that States already have under the international human 
rights law.95 Those obligations are both of  a negative 
and positive nature.96 For example, under the duty to 
respect human rights, States have a negative obligation 
to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of  any 
human rights.97 By way of  example, States would violate 
the negative duty to respect human rights, if  they would 
prioritise business interests over human rights, without 
an adequate justification for doing so.98  The duty to pro-
tect and the duty to fulfill human rights are of  a positive 
nature, which means that this duty imposes require-
ments for a standard of  conduct rather than a standard of  
result.99 In ensuring an adequate standard of  conduct, States 
93  SHAW, Malcolm N. International law. 7. ed. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge Univ Press, 2014. (n. 6). p. 182-183.
94  SHUE, Henry. The interdependence of  rights: the right to food. 
Leida: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 1984. p. 83-84.
95  SCHUTTER, Olivier de. International human rights law: cases, 
materials, commentary. 2. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014. p. 280-291.
96  UNITED NATIONS. Office of  the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Principles and guidelines for a human 
rights approach to poverty reduction strategies. 2012. (HR/PUB/06/12). 
p. 48.
97  UNITED NATIONS. General Comment n. 31 (2004) on Art 
2 of  the ICCPR: the Nature of  the general legal obligation imposed 
on states parties to the covenant, 2004 para 6. (‘The legal obligation 
under article 2, paragraph 1 is both negative and positive in nature. 
State Parties must refrain from violation of  the rights recognised by 
the Covenant, and any restriction on those rights must be permis-
sible under the relevant provision of  the Covenant.’)
98  UNITED NATIONS. Economic on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. General comment n. 24 (2017) on State obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the context of  business activities, 2017. p. 12; AUGEN-
STEIN, Daniel. State responsibilities to regulate and adjudicate corporate 
activities under the European Convention on Human Rights: Submission to 
the Special Representative of  the United Nations Secretary-General 
(SRSG) on the issue of  Human Rights and Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises, 2011.
99  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Council: promotion of  all 
must take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish 
and provide appropriate redress when human rights vio-
lations have in fact occurred.100 While States’ discretion 
in how exactly to go about this issue is preserved, in 
practice such Steps are implemented by taking legislati-
ve, administrative, judicial, financial, educational and so-
cial measures,101 a fact that is also reinforced in the text 
of  Principle 3 of  the UNGPs.102 Furthermore, as evi-
denced by jurisprudence, overall the positive obligation 
to protect against human rights abuses is composed of  
several different elements, such as substantive obligations, 
which are normally implemented through legislation,103 
procedural obligations to investigate and punish human ri-
ghts abuses104 and an obligation to monitor high-risk activi-
ties.105 Consequently, in the context of  States’ positive 
duty to protect human rights and the State-business 
nexus, the obligation to monitor high-risk activities is 
likely to imply an obligation to conduct due diligence 
human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, 
including the right to development: business and human rights: 
towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and remedy” frame-
work: report of  the special representative of  the Secretary-General 
on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises. 2009. (A/HRC/11/13). p. 13. 
100  UNITED NATIONS. Human Rights Council: promotion of  
all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, 
including the right to development: business and human rights: 
towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and remedy” frame-
work: report of  the special representative of  the Secretary-General 
on the issue of  human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises. 2009. (A/HRC/11/13). p. 14.
101  General Comment 3, The nature of  States parties obligations 
(Art. 2, par.1 of  the ICESCR): 14/12/90. 1990 para 7. UNITED 
NATIONS. Office of  the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
CESCR General Comment 3, The nature of  States parties obliga-
tions: art. 2, par. 1 of  the ICESCR. 14 dez. 1990.
102  UNGP Principle 3 states that: ‘In meeting their duty to pro-
tect, States should: (a) Enforce laws that are aimed at, or have the 
effect of, requiring business enterprises to respect human rights, and 
periodically to assess the adequacy of  such laws and address any 
gaps; (b) Ensure that other laws and policies governing the creation 
and ongoing operation of  business enterprises, such as corporate 
law, do not constrain but enable business respect for human rights; 
(c) Provide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to 
respect human rights throughout their operations; (d) Encourage, 
and where appropriate require, business enterprises to communicate 
how they address their human rights impacts.’
103  CASE of  López Ostra v Spain. ECHR, 1990. (Application 
n. 16798/90). p. 51-53; CASE of  Tatar v Romaina. ECHR, 2001. 
(Application n. 67021/01). p. 88.
104  CASE of  Hatton & ors v United Kingdom. ECHR, 1997. 
(Application n. 36022/97). p. 104.
105  LAGOUTTE, Stephanie. The state duty to protect against business-
related human rights abuses: unpacking Pillar 1 and 3 of  the UN Guid-
ing Principles on Human Rights and Business. Copenhagen: Danish 
Institute for Human Rights, 2014. (Ano 2014/1). p. 13.
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on those activities. For example, if  States own or control 
SOEs, or conduct commercial transactions with entities 
that operate in certain high-risk activities, States would 
have an obligation, as a matter of  international law, to 
monitor the activities of  those entities by performing 
continuous due diligence, as discussed above in the con-
text of  Principles 4, 5 and 6 of  the UNGPs. 
25. Since the UNGPs have been endorsed in 2011, 
there has been an increased focus on the concept of  
due diligence in the context of  the corporate respon-
sibility to respect human rights under Pillar II of  the 
UNGPs. However, it should be recalled that due dili-
gence is a principle that is well entrenched in internatio-
nal law, and which forms a core part of  the State’s duty 
to protect human rights, as has been established in cases 
such as Velàsquez – Rodriguez v Honduras where the Inter-
-American Court of  Human Rights stated that:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which 
is initially not directly imputable to a State (for 
example, because it is the act of  a private person 
or because the person responsible has not been 
identified) can lead to international responsibility of  
the State, not because of  the act itself, but because 
of  the lack of  due diligence to prevent the violation 
or to respond to it as required by the Convention.106
26. In this context, as it was clarified by the Inter-
national Court of  Justice, due diligence implies the 
obligation to ‘employ all means reasonably available’ to 
avoid a negative outcome.107 However, States’ due diligence 
obligations should not be confused with the concept of  
‘human rights due diligence’, which is a relatively newer 
concept introduced by the UNGPs, and which can be 
expressly found in UNGPs 17 to 21.108 This is because, 
as mentioned above, States’ due diligence obligations 
106  VELÀSQUEZ Rodríguez v Honduras: Judgment of  july 29, 
1988, Inter-AmCtHR (Ser C) n. 4 (1988). University of  Minnesota, 
[1988]. p. 172. 
107  APPLICATION of  the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide: Bosnia and Herzegovina v 
Serbia and Montenegro. Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007. p. 43 [430]. 
([I]t is clear that the obligation in question is one of  conduct and not 
one of  result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation 
to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commis-
sion of  genocide; the obligation of  States parties is rather to employ 
all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide as 
far as possible.)
108  For example, UNGP Principle 17 states that ‘in order to iden-
tify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse 
human rights impacts, business enterprises, should carry out human 
rights due diligence.’ Human rights due diligence is thus viewed as a 
‘process’ which involves ‘assessing actual and potential human rights 
impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses 
and communicating how impacts are addressed.’
arise as a matter of  international law,109 while ‘human 
rights due diligence’ is a voluntary mechanism that tar-
gets business enterprises generally and which ensures 
that businesses ‘can identify, prevent, mitigate and ac-
count for the harms that they may cause, and throu-
gh which judicial and regulatory bodies, can assess and 
enterprise’s respect for human rights.’110 Furthermore, 
a recent empirical study, which analysed State practice 
that spanned more than 100 jurisdictions, has conclu-
ded that due diligence is ‘not a creation of  the UN Hu-
man Rights Council nor [is it] a voluntary measure for 
corporate social responsibility’, because it ‘originates 
from the legal tools that States are already using to en-
sure that business behaviour meets social expectations, 
including standards set in law.’111  
27. Another issue to consider – which further sup-
ports the argument that States are have an obligation as 
a matter of  international law to perform due diligence 
in the context of  the State-business nexus – is that it 
is only reasonable to assume that a State should be aware 
about how its SOEs operate, given the fact that it is 
the State that ultimately sets out the operational stra-
tegy for all its SOEs, as the official State Ownership 
Policies of  Sweden and Finland have already showed. 
There are further examples, in this regard, which su-
pport the argument that States are very well aware of  
the manner in which their SOEs operate. For example, 
in China the State-owned Assets Supervision and Ad-
109  BONNITCHA, Jonathan; MCCORQUODALE, Robert. 
The concept of  “due diligence” in the un guiding principles on busi-
ness and human rights. European Journal of  International Law, v. 28, 
Issue 3, p. 899-919, nov. 2017. p. 904-905.
110  SCHUTTER, Olivier de et al. Human rights due diligence: the 
role of  states. 2012. Available at: <http://humanrightsinbusiness.
eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/De-Schutter-et-al.-Human-
Rights-Due-Diligence-The-Role-of-States.pdf>.; Bonnitcha and 
McCorquodale (n. 110). p. 907. For example, Bonnitcha and Mc-
Corquodale argue that there could be some negative consequences 
of  the fact that due diligence is viewed as a process rather than a 
legal requirement by businesses. Firstly, it is believed that this ‘en-
courages the incorrect view that implementing due diligence pro-
cesses is sufficient to discharge businesses’ responsibility to respect 
human rights’ (at 910). Secondly, the authors believe that ‘the failure 
to distinguish between the two different meanings of  due diligence 
creates confusion about he situations in which businesses that in-
fringe human rights can be said to have breached their responsibil-
ity to respect human rights and, therefore, to have a responsibility 
to provide a remedy within the scheme established by the Guiding 
Principles.’)
111  SCHUTTER, Olivier de et al. Human rights due diligence: the 
role of  states. 2012. Available at: <http://humanrightsinbusiness.
eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/De-Schutter-et-al.-Human-
Rights-Due-Diligence-The-Role-of-States.pdf>. p. 4.
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ministration Commission (SASAC) is the agency that 
sets the strategy for all of  China’s SOEs.112 SASAC has 
recently issued certain Guidelines to the State-owned 
Enterprises Directly under the Central Government 
on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities.113 Tho-
se Guidelines require that SOEs operate their business 
in a legal and honest manner, make sustainable profits, 
improve their products and services, fulfill their corpo-
rate social responsibilities, engage with communities, 
conserve resources, and protect the environment and 
the legal rights of  their employees in their operations. 
The main measures that SOEs should take is to increase 
awareness of  corporate social responsibility, set up pro-
cedures in this regard, including associated reporting, 
and increase dialogue and international cooperation. 
The Guidelines are clear that in doing so it will help 
China in ‘establishing a “responsible” public image’.114 
The Ministry of  Commerce and the Ministry of  Envi-
ronmental Protection have also issued a Guidance on 
Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and 
Cooperation, which states that all enterprises operating 
abroad should: have measures in place to ensure envi-
ronmental protection; respect the religions and customs 
of  the host State; respect the environmental laws of  the 
host State; and should conduct environmental impact 
assessments.115 
28. SOEs are also ‘encouraged to study and learn 
from environmental principles, standards and practices 
of  international organisations and multinational finan-
cial institutions.’116 The China Banking and Regulatory 
112  SASAC About SASAC - SASAC Main Functions - SASAC. 
Available at: <http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408028/n1408521/index.
html>.
113  STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND AD-
MINISTRATION COUNCIL. Guidelines to the State-owned enterprises 
directly under the central government on fulfilling corporate social responsibilities. 
Available at: <http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408035/c1477196/con-
tent.html>.
114  STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND AD-
MINISTRATION COUNCIL. Guidelines to the State-owned enterprises 
directly under the central government on fulfilling corporate social responsibilities. 
Available at: <http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408035/c1477196/con-
tent.html>.
115  MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLES´S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA. MOFCOM and MEP jointly issued guidance on environ-
mental protection in foreign investment and cooperation. 2013. Available at: 
<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significant-
news/201303/20130300043146.shtml>.
116  MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLES´S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA. MOFCOM and MEP jointly issued guidance on environ-
mental protection in foreign investment and cooperation. 2013. Available at: 
<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significant-
Commission has also issued the Green Credit Guide-
lines whose purpose is to require banks that finance 
overseas investment to strengthen environmental and 
corporate social responsibility requirements.117 Arti-
cle 21 of  the Green Credit Guidelines requires banks 
to ensure that the businesses they lend to respect the 
host State laws and regulations concerning the environ-
ment and ‘make a promise in public that appropriate 
international practices or international norms will be 
followed’. Some other sector specific instruments, such 
as the Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound 
Mining Investments do expressly incorporate the UN-
GPs and state that those companies must ‘observe the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
during the entire lifecycle of  the mining project.’118 In 
late 2017, the China Chamber of  Commerce of  Me-
tals, Minerals and Chemical Importers and Exporters 
entered into a formal agreement with the International 
Council on Mining and Metals to ‘help promote sus-
tainable development in Chinese companies’ overseas 
mining investments.119
29. Overall, this section has shown that the concept 
of  due diligence sits at the heart of  the second element 
of  the State-business nexus. While the UNGPs do not 
impose additional obligations on States and the langua-
ge used therein does not indicate that States would have 
to always perform due diligence in the context of  the 
State-business nexus, it was argued that States may be 
required to so anyway, in order to comply with their 
obligations under international law to ‘protect, respect 
and fulfill’ human rights. This is because States, as part 
of  the positive duty to respect human rights, must mo-
nitor high-risk activities. Furthermore, it is only reaso-
nable to assume that States should know how the entities 
that they own or control operate, given that they ulti-
mately set the operational strategy for all those entities.
news/201303/20130300043146.shtml>.
117  NOTICE of  the CBRC on issuing the green credit guide-
lines.  Available at: <http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/EngdocView.do?docI
D=3CE646AB629B46B9B533B1D8D9FF8C4A>.
118  CHINA. China Chamber of  Commerce of  Metals, Minerals 
& Chemicals Importers & Exporters. CCMCMC Guidelines for Social 
Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments. 2014
119  INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING E MET-
ALS (ICMM). Chinese mining body aligns with icmm to promote mining 
with principles. 2017. Available at: <https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/
news/2017/icmm-signs-mou-with-cccmc>.
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5. conclusIon
30. This article has sought to understand how the 
UNGPs address the State-business nexus. It has been 
shown that this concept entered into the narrative of  
the UNGPs relatively early on and that Professor Ru-
ggie understood that States must also be engaged in 
addressing human rights challenges in their own right as 
economic actors, and not just in their capacity as States. 
This ultimately led to the inclusion in the UNGPs of  
Principles 4, 5 and 6. In this context, it has been shown 
that, although the UNGPs were not initially clear who 
exactly were the actors that fell within the ambit of  the 
State-business nexus, later developments suggested that 
the approach adopted is very broad and that it inclu-
des all manner of  entities that are owned or controlled 
by States, regardless of  how they are formally structu-
red from a legal point of  view. Furthermore, a close 
examination of  the State-business nexus leads to the 
conclusion that there are three perspectives from which 
this concept is approached in the UNGPs. Principle 4 
applies to those entities that are owned or controlled by the 
State or that receive substantial support and services from the 
State. Principle 5 applies equally to privately owned entities 
that may operate in certain sectors that were previously 
State-owned. Principle 6 applies to all other entities with 
whom States may enter into commercial transactions. It has 
been argued that the coverage by the UNGPs of  the 
State-business nexus from three perspective mirrors – 
to a certain extent – the broad approach adopted by the 
ILC Articles 4, 5 and 8, which also seek to ensure that 
States are ultimately accountable for the acts of  those 
entities, when it is not initially apparent how those en-
tities fit in the structure of  the State. An investigation 
into the content of  the State-business nexus concluded 
that this concept is composed of  two elements. The 
first element requires States to take ‘additional steps’ to 
ensure that the entities that are owned, controlled or 
‘that receive substantial support and services’ from the 
State behave as model corporate citizens. The second 
element of  the State-business nexus deals with the ‘re-
quirement’ to perform due diligence in certain circums-
tances. In this context, it has been argued that, while a 
strict interpretation of  this element in the context of  
the UNGPs does not indicate that this is a mandatory 
requirement, its interpretation in light of  the broader 
State obligations to ‘protect, respect and fulfill’ human 
rights seems to indicate that this is nevertheless the 
case. This would ultimately mean that States have an 
obligation to perform due diligence on all the activities 
of  their SOEs as part of  their obligation to monitor 
high-risk activities. This conclusion is also supported by 
a reasonable expectation that States should know how the 
entities that they own or control operate, given that in 
the great majority of  cases, it is the State that ultimately 
sets out the operational strategy of  those entities.
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